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FEDERAL POWER TO PUNISH INDIVIDUAL CRIMES UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
Alfred Avins*
I. Introduction
The recent companion cases of United States v. Guest' and United States v.
Price2 have raised the question of the extent of Congress's power to punish crimes
committed by one individual against another. This question has been of con-
siderable public interest as a result of the murders of several northern civil rights
workers in southern states which have gone unsolved, and other acts of violence
in recent years which, to a greater or lesser extent, have been traceable to racial
tensions.
In the Price case, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held that
private parties who conspired with public officials to murder three persons were
equally acting under color of law with the officials in depriving the dead persons
of life and liberty without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment, and hence could be punished by federal law enacted to enforce
that amendment. In the Guest case, on the other hand, there were four dif-
ferent opinions, some of which found a rather tenuous "state action" basis while
others deemed it unnecessary. However, obiter dicta in the opinions of at least
six justices appear to indicate that, to some extent at least, the majority has
obliterated the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment for the
permissible exercise of congressional power, by holding that private conspiracies
or violence designed to deter Negroes from exercising alleged fourteenth amend-
ment rights may be punished by federal legislation enacted pursuant to section
five of that amendment as an enforcement of the equal protection clause.'
It is noteworthy that unlike several recent cases which have largely ignored
legislative history in construing the fourteenth amendment,4 the opinions in the
Guest and Price cases accept the relevancy of original understanding by the
Congress, the latter case appending a copious quotation from the remarks of
one of the reconstruction senators.5 Since the Court itself has accepted the
hypothesis that the original understanding of the framers is controlling, an
inquiry as to what that understanding was conforms strictly with the Courts
own premises. The purpose of this article is to examine the original understand-
ing of the framers of the fourteenth amendment and to determine whether these
cases, particularly the Guest case, accurately reflect that understanding insofar
as the one holds that the federal government may punish crime pursuant to the
* Member, United States Supreme Court Bar, District of Columbia Bar, Florida Bar,
New York Bar; B.A., Hunter College, 1954; LL.B., Columbia University Law School, 1956;
LL.M., New York University Law School, 1957; J.S.D., University of Chicago, 1962; Ph.D.,
University of Cambridge, 1965; Professor of Law, Memphis State University Law School.
1 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
2 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
3 See the concurring opinions in Guest of Justices Clark and Brennan.
4 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
5 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807-20 (1966).
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fourteenth amendment even though that crime has not been committed under
state authority.
II. The Fourteenth Amendment Debates
The equal protection clause has its genesis in the celebrated Hoar incident
of ante-bellum days. As a result of a conspiracy to incite an insurrection of
slaves, South Carolina passed a law which forbade freed Negroes, who were
looked on as natural leaders of slave revolts, from entering the state and required
the imprisonment of Negro sailors on their ships while the ships were in port.'
In November 1844, former Representative Samuel Hoar, a leading Massa-
chusetts lawyer, was sent by that state's officials to South Carolina to test the
constitutionality of the law in the federal courts. His arrival caused great public
excitement, and he was threatened with personal violence. The state authorities
refused, or expressed the inability to protect Hoar against mob violence, and
on December 5, 1844, the South Carolina legislature passed a resolution expelling
him from the state.' The incident caused great indignation in the North and
became a constant subject of reproach by northern members of the Congress
against the South.' For example, Representative John A. Bingham, the Radical
Republican lawyer from Ohio who drafted the first section of the fourteenth
amendment, gave as one of the reasons for introducing his amendment that the
guarantee of privileges and immunities in article IV, section 2 of the original
Constitution
was utterly disregarded in the past by South Carolina when she drove with
indignity and contempt and scorn from her limits the honored representa-
tive of Massachusetts, who went thither upon the peaceful mission of
asserting in the tribunals of South Carolina the rights of American citizens.9
The Justice Department's brief in Guest asserted that the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, which proposed the fourteenth amendment, had before it testimony
of various persons about private as well as official persecution of white southern
unionists, northerners in the South, and Negroes.1" The brief therefore con-
cluded that the "inference is compelling that not only the Joint Committee, but
Congress as a whole, and also the ratifying legislatures, regarded the Fourteenth
Amendment as empowering Congress to deal effectively with the atrocities de-
picted in the testimony."" Apparently, the majority of the Supreme Court agreed
with the Justice Department that this meant that Congress would be empowered
to deal directly with private individuals who without state sanction commit
6 See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., app. 1675 (1850). Hereinafter, the Congres-
sional Globe will be cited by congress, session, page, and year, viz: 31 (1) GLOBE app. 1675
(1850).
7 BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CoNGREss, 1774-1927, at 1103 (1928).
8 See, e.g., 30 (2) GLOBE 418-19 (1849) (remarks of Representative Hudson); 31(1)
GLOBE app. 123-24 (1850) (remarks of Senator Clay); id. at app. 288-89 '(remarks of
Senator Butler); id. at 1663 (remarks of Senator Davis); 33 (1) GLOBE 1012-13 (1854)
(remarks of Senator Sumner) ; 34 (1) GLOBE 1598 (1856) (remarks of Representative Comins).
9 39 (1) GLOBE 158 (1865).
10 Brief for appellant at 35-36, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
11 Id. at 37.
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crimes against other persons. The historical evidence, however, does not sustain
this point of view.
It is true that evidence of crime in the South, of a political or racial nature,
was widespread. This was in part brought on by disorganization and virtual
anarchy consequent on the termination of the Civil War and the resulting
collapse of economic and political institutions. The Justice Department's brief
cited testimony before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction 12 and the Schurz
report1 8 both of which were widely circulated. Although much of this material
was hearsay, the Republicans in Congress nevertheless believed it, or professed
to believe it, and the material is therefore of value in construing congressional
intent.
In addition, there were a considerable number of references on the floor of
Congress to crime in the South. Even before the termination of the war, Repre-
sentative William D. Kelley, a Radical Republican lawyer from Pennsylvania;
warned the House that the southern state governments, if left on their own,
would do nothing to protect the white loyalists or Negroes from private violence.1 4
Senator Henry Wilson, a Massachusetts Republican, attacked the murders and
outrages being committed on freedmen by southerners to enforce the "black
codes," and even Senator Reverdy Johnson, a Maryland Democrat and former
Attorney-General of the United States, admitted that "to a certain extent [the
report] is true. .. *"5 Representative Thomas D. Eliot, a Massachusetts Re-
publican, said that houses were being burned and freedmen murdered in Mis-
sissippi.' 6 Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee and a former state supreme court justice of Illinois, who was virtual leader
of the Senate Republicans in matters relating to reconstruction, read dispatches
that murder of unionists and Negroes was imminent in the South, and asserted
that "the negro really has no protection afforded him either by the civil authori-
ties or judicial tribunals of the State."'" Wilson added that these murders were
going unpunished."8 Representative Sidney Perham, a Maine Republican, cited.
the Schurz Report and asserted that all the reports from the South indicated
that loyalists, both white and colored, were being "murdered in cold blood,"
and that northerners and federal officers were being intimidated by threats of
violence and murder. He added that these murders were going unpunished,
and that in Kentucky the state courts, instead of protecting unionists, were per-
secuting them at the instance of rebels.'9
Towards the end of the session, Representative William Windom, a Minne-
sota Republican, made reference to southerners' "violent efforts to drive out
the few Union people who remain among them; their murders of Unionists,
12 Id. at 36.
13 C. SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE STATES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, ALABAMA, MISSIS-
sIPPi, AND LOUISIANA, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1865).
14 38 (2) GLOBE 289 '(1865).
15 39 (1) GLOBE 40 (1865).
16 Id. at 517 (1866).
17 Id. at 941.
18 Id. at app. 140. To the same effect, see 39 (2) Globe 104 (1866).
19 39 (1) GLOBE 2082-83 '(1866).
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and destruction of their dwellings, schoolhouses, and churches . ,,." Repre-
sentative George W. Julian, a Radical Republican from Indiana, declared:
A feeling scarcely less intolerant is evinced toward the few loyal white
men in these States, who in many localities are living in constant dread of
violence and murder, and are frequently waylaid and shot. Quite recently
I have received a letter from a gentleman of intelligence and worth in one
of the southern States, in which he says that he and his friends and neighbors,
who have been hunted in the mountains like deer all through the war be-
cause they refused to take up arms against their country, having had their
houses plundered or burned, their property destroyed, and themselves re-
duced to beggary, are still living in constant dread of assassination; and he
begs me, if possible, to procure for them from the Secretary of War trans-
portation to the North.
2'
Somewhat later, Senator Oliver P. Morton, an Indiana Republican, stated that
so far from answering the purpose for which governments are intended,
they [the southern Johnson governments] failed to extend protection to the
loyal men, either white or black. The loyal men were murdered with
impunity; and I will thank any Senator upon this floor to point to a single
case in any of the rebel States where a rebel has been tried and brought to
punishment by the civil authority for the murder of a Union man. Not
one case, I am told, can be found.
22
Instances of murder and assault against freedmen, and the burning of
schoolhouses and other buildings which they were using, were given by the House
Committee on Freedmen's Affairs as one of the reasons for prolonging the life
of the Freedmen's Bureau.2 ' The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which
proposed the fourteenth amendment, justified it, inter alia, because of the "acts
of cruelty, oppression, and murder [of freedmen], which the local authorities
are at no pains to prevent or punish."
2
The Department of Justice was therefore correct in asserting, and the
Supreme Court was not in error in accepting, the proposition that the fourteenth
amendment was framed to add a measure of protection to persons who would
become the victims of crime. The Department's error, and the Court's misappre-
hension, lie in misconceiving the remedy provided by the Thirty-Ninth Congress
in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. This point will
now be examined.
III. The Drafts of the Fourteenth Amendment
On February 26, 1866, Representative Bingham reported, for the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, a proposed constitutional amendment which in
20 Id. at 3170.
21 Id. at 3210. See also id. at app. 296 (remarks of Representative Shellabarger).
22 40 (2) GLOBE 725 (1868).
23 H.R. R-. No. 30, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 26-29 (1868).
24 S. RP. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1866).
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altered form was later to become the first section of the fourteenth amendment
except for the declaration as to citizenship. This proposal stated:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
25
Bingham pointed out that this proposal was simply an amalgam of the fifth
amendment and the privileges and immunities clause contained in article IV,
section 2, coupled with a grant of power to Congress to enforce them. Bingham
added that while these obligations already rested on the states, state officers of
the southern states had habitually disregarded them.26
About seven weeks earlier, Bingham had protested that northern anti-
slavery men were unsafe if they went to the South.2" He demanded security
from the South for the future. He said that the guarantees of the existing
privileges and immunities clause were not enforced and were disregarded. He
added:
I propose, with the help of this Congress and of the American people,
that hereafter there shall not be any disregard of that essential guarantee
of your Constitution in any State of the Union. And how? By simply
adding an amendment to the Constitution to operate on all the States of
this Union alike, giving to Congress the power to pass all laws necessary
and proper to secure to all persons- which includes every citizen of every
State -their equal personal rights; and if the tribunals of South Carolina
will not respect the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts under the Con-
stitution of their common country, I desire to see the Federal judiciary
clothed with the power to take cognizance of the question, and assert those
rights by solemn judgment, inflicting upon the offenders such penalties as
will compel a decent respect for this guarantee to all the citizens of every
State.
28
Bingham's amendment was immediately attacked for giving Congress exces-
sive power."0 Representative Andrew J. Rogers, a New Jersey Democrat and a
minority member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, attacked it for
centralizing the government."0 The longest attack came from Representative
Robert S. Hale, an ex-judge and New York Republican. Hale asserted that the
proposal gave Congress power to supplant state civil and criminal codes. He
rejected the suggestion of Representative Thaddeus Stevens that the provision
only gave Congress the right to interfere when state laws were unequal and
asserted that Congress would directly be able to assure protection to one indi-
vidual against acts of another individual."- Hale attacked the amendment for
25 39 (1) GLOBE 1034'(1866).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 157.
28 Id. at 158.
29 See generally C. Tansill, A. Avins, S. Crutchfield and K. Colegrove, The Fourteenth
Amendment and Real Property Rights, in OPEN OCCUPANCY VS. FORCED HOUSING UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT 68, 76-80 (Avins ed. 1963).
30 39 (1) GLOBE app. 133 (1866).
31 Id. at 1063-64.
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centralizing power in the hands of the federal government. 2
Representative Thomas T. Davis, a New York Republican, echoed Hale's
fears. He objected that the proposed amendment "is a grant for original legis-
lation by Congress." 33 Still a third New York Republican lawyer, Representative
Giles W. Hotchkiss, asserted that it gave Congress power to establish uniform
laws for the protection of life, liberty, and property. Hotchkiss stated that he
would be glad to support an amendment prohibiting state discrimination, but
he opposed the Bingham draft because he also did not want Congress to have
any such direct power. Representative Roscoe Conkling, a New York Repub-
lican lawyer who was a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
likewise opposed the proposal as being too radical.3 4
The view that the Bingham proposal gave Congress direct power to legis-
late in order to punish individual crimes and conspiracies is supported by a
statement of one of its supporters who was not a lawyer. The following colloquy
occurring between Representative Hiram Price, an Iowa Republican, and Repre-
sentative Edwin Wright, a New Jersey Democrat, dearly shows that in Price's
view the equal protection portion of the Bingham proposal would have given
Congress power to punish private violence directed at preventing persons from
exercising their federal constitutional rights:
Mr. PRICE. . .. I have learned within the last two weeks from a
man who went from the State of Illinois into the State of Mississippi with
seven companions, making eight in all, to work in a machine shop, and
that there came back only six of them, the other two having been murdered
between the shop and their boarding house....
Mr. WRIGHT. I rise to a question of order. I insist that the gentle-
man must confine himself to the subject under discussion. We are not
trying murder cases.
Mr. PRICE. I say, sir, that the intention of the resolution before the
House is to give the same rights, privileges, and protection to the citizen
of one State going into another that a citizen of that State would have who
had lived there for years.
The SPEAKER. That is clearly in order. . . . The Chair sustains
the gentleman from Iowa, as his remarks are clearly in order.
Mr. PRICE. ... Now, sir, if that is the intention of the resolution,
if it is designed to protect a citizen of Pennsylvania, New York, Iowa, or
any other free State in going into a southern State . . . then I am most
decidedly in favor of it .... 15
In urging his amendment, Bingham declared that although the federal
government could protect American citizens abroad, it was powerless to protect
them at home.3" Instead, he acknowledged that "citizens must rely upon the
State for their protection.""7 However, Bingham did not assert any desire tW
32 Id. at 1065.
33 Id. at 1087.
34 Id. at 1095.
35 Id. at 1066.
36 Id. at 1090.
37 Id. at 1093.
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punish individual crimes directed at preventing the exercise of constitutional
rights. Quite the contrary, through the maze of his high-flown rhetoric runs the
aim of punishing state officials who refused to protect" tizens, rather than punish-
ing private individuals. For example, Bingham asked how a penal.prohibition
of state denial of equal protection could impair states' rights if all persons were
entitled to such protection. He also added that federal courts did not have
authority to redress denial of equal protection "which is being practiced now
in more States than one of the Union under the authority of State laws...
Bingham asserted that without his proposal the state legislatures might break
their oaths to support the Constitution and pass unconstitutional acts as they
had done in the past. He said:
The question is, simply, whether you will give by this amendment to
the people of the United States the power, by legislative enactment, to
punish officials of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them by
their Constitution? That is the question, and the whole question. . . . If
they [state legislatures] conspire together to enact laws refusing equal pro-
tection to life, liberty, or property, the Congress is thereby vested with power
to hold them to answer before the bar of the national courts for the viola-
tion of their oaths and of the rights of their fellow-men.39
Bingham protested that if southerners regained control of their state governments,
they would pass the laws of banishment, confiscation, imprisonment, and murder
that prevailed in the South during the Civil War. He observed that there was
"no law anywhere upon our statute-books to punish penally any State officer
for denying in any State to any citizen of the United States protection in the
rights of life, liberty, and prolSerty.""O He added: "where is the express power
to define and punish crimes committed in any State by its official officers in
violation of the rights of citizens and persons as declared in the Constitution?" '4 1
The following exchange then occurred:
Mr. HALE. I desire . . . to ask him, as an able constitutional lawyer
whether in his opinion this proposed amendment to the Constitution
does not confer upon Congress a general power of legislation for the pur-
pose of securing to all persons in the several States protection of life, liberty,
and property, subject only to the qualification that that protection shall
be equal.
Mr. BINGHAM. I believe it does in regard to life and liberty and
property as I have heretofore stated it ....
Mr. HALE. The gentleman misapprehends my point, or else I mis-
apprehend his answer. My question was whether this provision, if adopted,
confers upon Congress general powers of legislation in regard to the protec-
tion of life, liberty, and personal property.
Mr. BINGHAM. It certainly does this: it confers upon Congress
power to see to it that the protection given by the laws of the States shall
be equal in respect to life and liberty and property to all persons.42
38 Id. at 1089.
39 Id. at 1090.
40 Id. at 1093.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1094.
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At the insistence of the Republican House leadership, the Bingham pro-
posal was indefinitely postponed.4 3 It was never reintroduced, but rather it was
redrafted into the form of the present amendment. Representative James A.
Garfield, the Ohio Republican lawyer who later became President, observed
several years later that the Bingham draft first introduced was postponed at
the instance of the House leadership because "it became perfectly evident . ..
that the measure could not command a two-thirds vote of Congress, and for that
reason the proposition was virtually withdrawn."4 Garfield had earlier observed:
Now, let it be remembered that the proposed amendment was a plain,
unambiguous proposition to empower Congress to legislate directly upon
the citizens of all the States in regard to their rights of life, liberty, and
property... After a debate of two weeks.., it became evident that many
leading Republicans of this House would not consent to so radical a change
in the Constitution, and the bill was recommitted to the joint select com-
mittee.45
When the revised version of the first section of the fourteenth amendment
was reported out, Representative Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the House Radical
Republicans, observed that this section "allows Congress to correct the unjust
legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall
operate equally upon all." 46 Bingham, too, referred to the first section as giving
Congress the power to protect citizens against unconstitutional state legislation.4"
Senator Jacob Howard, a Michigan Republican lawyer, reporting the same
provision to the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
noted that the equal protection clause was directed at abolishing "all class legis-
lation," and that the fifth section of the amendment was designed to give Con-
gress the power to carry out the guarantees of the first section.48 Senator Luke
Poland, a Vermont Republican and a former chief justice of that state's supreme
court, speaking in favor of the revised and final version of the first section, like-
wise noted that it was designed to "uproot and destroy all . . .partial State
legislation" just as the previously passed civil rights bill was intended to do. 9
Senator Timothy Howe, a Wisconsin Radical Republican and a former state
supreme court justice, in supporting the amendment, also urged that it would
correct unjust legislation. ° Senator John Henderson, a Missouri Republican,
referred to it as a "provision securing equal protection of the laws against
inimical State legislation.""'
It is evident from the foregoing that the original intention of the framers
was only to permit Congress to enact laws which affected the activities of state
officials. The question may be asked, how was this expected to cure the private
violence in the South with which Congress was concerned? The answer lies in
43 Id. (remarks of Representative Conling).
44 42 (1) GLOBE app. 151 '(1871).
45 Id.
46 39 (1) GLOBE 2459 (1866).
47 Id. at 2542.
48 Id. at 2766.
49 Id. at 2961.
50 Id. at app. 219.
51 Id. at 3035.
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an analysis of the Civil Rights Bill, the substantive principles of which the first
section of the fourteenth amendment was designed to incorporate.52 In intro-
ducing this bill, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, Republican Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, observed that his bill would not apply in states
which had equal laws.5" Indeed, the second section, which was the penal enforce-
ment provision, required that, to be penalized, the person depriving Negroes of
their rights would have to be acting under color of law.5" Senator Garrett
Davis, a Kentucky Democrat, opposed the bill because state judges and officers
could be punished for executing state constitutions and laws."5 Trumbull replied
that since Negroes had been freed under the thirteenth amendment, they were
citizens and hence entitled to the privileges and immunities given citizens by
article IV, section 2 of the original Constitution. 6 He later explained that state
judges and other officials who refused Negroes the protection of the laws should
be punished for not doing their duty under the Constitution, but he added:
These words "under color of law" were inserted as words of limitation,
and not for the purpose of punishing persons who would not have been
subject to punishment under the act if they had been omitted. If an offense
is committed against a colored person simply because he is colored, in a
State where the law affords him the same protection as if he were white,
this act neither has nor was intended to have anything to do with his case,
because he has adequate remedies in the State courts; but if he is discrim-
inated against under color of State laws because he is colored, then it
becomes necessary to interfere for his protection. 7
In the House, Representative William Lawrence, an Ohio Republican and
a former state judge, made the same observation. He pointed out that there
were two ways in which a state could deprive citizens of their rights, either by
the passage of prohibitory laws, or by "a failure to protect any one of them."
Thus, if a state should enact laws for the protection of one group of citizens
and simply omit to pass a law for the protection of others, this would constitute
a denial of equal protection granted by the laws.55 Lawrence further noted that
the bill did not undertake to punish individual crimes against citizens respecting
their life, liberty, or property, but rather constituted an enforcement of the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution.
Lawrence decried states which authorize such offenses against life, liberty, or
property, or deny to a class of citizens all protection against them." He approved
the punishment of state officers guilty of such offenses.60
The following colloquy between Representative James Wilson, an Iowa
Republican lawyer and Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, who was
52 See Tansill et al., supra note 29, at 81.
53 39 (1) GLOBE 476 (1866).
54 Id. at 475.
55 Id. at 598.
56 Id. at 600.
57 Id. at 1758.
58 Id. at 1833.
59 Id. at 1835.
60 Id. at 1837. He said: "And if an officer shall intentionally deprive a citizen of a right,
knowing him to be entitled to it, then he is guilty of willful wrong which deserves punishment."
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
in charge of the Civil Rights Bill, and Representative Benjamin F. Loan, a
Missouri Republican lawyer, clearly illustrates the framers' intentions:
Mr. LOAN. Mr. Speaker, I desire to ask the chairman who reported
this bill, why the committee limit the provisions of the second section to
those who act under color of law. Why not let them apply to the whole
community where the acts are committed?
Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. That grows out of the fact that there is
discrimination in reference to civil rights under the local laws of the States,
Therefore we provide that the persons who under the color of these local
laws should do these things shall be liable to this punishment.
Mr. LOAN. What penalty is imposed upon others than officers who
inflict these wrongs on the citizen?
Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. We are not making a general criminal code
for the States.
Mr. LOAN. Why not abrogate those laws instead of inflicting penal-
ties upon officers who execute writs under them?
Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. A law without a sanction is of very little force.
Mr. LOAN. Then why not put it in the bill directly?
Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. That is what we are trying to do.61
Even though Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Bill for other reasons, his
views were exactly the same on this point. He never contemplated punishing
private individuals for private crimes, saying that
the care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen, under the
solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your Federal Constitution, is in the
States, and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to effect no
change in that respect in the Constitution of the country. I have advocated
here an amendment which would arm Congress with the power to compel
obedience to the oath, and punish all violations by State officers of the
bill of rights.... Standing upon this position, I may borrow the words ...
as truly descriptive of the American system: "centralized government,
decentralized administration." That, sir ... is the secret of your strength
and power.
I hold, sir, that our Constitution never conferred upon the Congress
of the United States the power -sacred as life is, first as it is before all
other rights which pertain to man on this side of the grave-to protect
it in time of peace by the terrors of the penal code within organized States;
and Congress has never attempted to do it. There never was a law upon
the United States statute-book to punish the murderer for taking away in
time of peace the life of the noblest, and the most unoffending as well, of
your citizens, within the limits of any State of the Union. The protection
of the citizen in that respect was left to the respective States, and there the




The conclusion from the foregoing material is clear. The Thirty-Ninth
Congress, in proposing the fourteenth amendment, never contemplated the
punishment of private individuals not acting pursuant to state law for crimes
committed against other individuals, regardless of the motive. Instead, such
61 Id. at 1120.
62 Id. at 1292.
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law enforcement activities were to be left to state officials, where they had
traditionally reposed. The remedy that Congress did propose was that if state
officials were derelict in their duty, imposed by the first section of the fourteenth
amendment, to protect the lives, liberty, and property of all persons equally,
then under the fifth section Congress could enforce the first section by punishing
such state officials for their willful dereliction. Thus, the theory was that if
state officials carried out their federally-imposed duty of protecting all persons
equally, crimes against southern white unionists, northern travelers in the south,
and Negroes would be prevented by these state officials exercising their tradi-
tional law enforcement powers. But in no event did the framers in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress contemplate that private criminals could be punished by federal
authority under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment. The defeat of
the original Bingham draft shows that Congress wanted to foreclose even the
possibility that such a power might be derived from the proposed amendment.
IV. The First Enforcement Act
In urging that Congress can reach private conspiracies that do not involve
public officers, the Justice Department's brief in the Guest case relied heavily on
section 241 of the Criminal Code,"3 which was originally derived from section 6
of the Enforcement Act of 1870.4 The Justice Department's brief quoted
extensively from the remarks of Senator John Pool of North Carolina,"5 which
the Court appended to its opinion in the Price case."s The Justice Department's
brief noted:
The most compelling evidence of the intent of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment is, of course, to be found in the reports and
debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress which drafted the Amendment and
proposed it to the States. But, unfortunately, those materials contain noth-
ing really conclusive on the point at issue here.67
As shown above, this premise is highly dubious, depending, of course, on what
one deems to be "really conclusive." The Justice Department's brief then pro-
ceeded to assert that the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, which was involved
in the Guest case, constituted a contemporaneous construction of the fourteenth
amendment and the similarly worded fifteenth amendment, since many of the
senators and representatives who voted for these amendments likewise voted for
the statutes enforcing them. The brief concluded that these members of Con-
gress acted under the belief that the amendments permitted Congress to punish
private violence not engaged in by state officials.6 This line of reasoning con-
tains several flaws.
The first of these flaws is the assumption that the dominant Radical Re-
publicans were fastidious about constitutional niceties during the reconstruction.
63 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
64 Ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140.
65 Brief for appellant at 14-15, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
66 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807-20 '(1966).
67 Brief for appellant at 33-34, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
68 Id. at 37-40.
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so that their legislation in fact represented true contemporaneous construction
of the relevant constitutional provisions. We have on record the very frank
confession of Representative John F. Farnsworth, an Illinois Republican lawyer
who supported these amendments, and who was an experienced representative
and prominent Union general, that the contrary was in fact the case. Farnsworth
stated
that I had given votes and done things during my twelve years' service in
the House of Representatives which I cannot defend, I have no doubt ....
I know we have done things during the war and during the process of
reconstruction to save the Republic which could not be defended if done
in peace. We were obliged to do some things ... which will scarcely bear
the test of the calm light of peace and constitutional law. We passed laws,
Mr. Speaker, and the country knows it, which we did not like to let go to
the Supreme Court for adjudication. And I am telling no tales out of
school....
Sir, we have done some things under the necessity of the case, and
under the war powers, and I am ready to do them again to save the nation's
life, which may be a little beyond the verge of the constitutional power
possessed by Congress in time of peace.69
In regard to the Enforcement Act itself, some remarks of Senator Jacob
Howard of Michigan point in the same direction. Howard began by observing
that he had been dissatisfied with the fifteenth amendment during its passage
and had offered a different version not limited to inhibiting state or federal
action."0 Indeed, he had been a carping critic of the amendment's phraseology.7'
Howard observed that the amendment as passed inhibited only state and federal
legislation:
It is a prohibition upon the two Governments, the Federal and the
State Government, by which they are respectively disabled from passing
any act by which this evil shall be created or encouraged. It does not, m
terms, relate to the conduct of mere individuals, and a very "strict construc-
tion" court of justice might, as I can well conceive, refuse to apply the
real principles of the amendment to the case of individuals who themselves,
as mere individuals, and not as authorized by Governments or Government
officers, should undertake to deny or prevent to a colored man the exercise
of his right of suffrage; and I have some fear, I confess, that owing to the
peculiar phraseology of this amendment some courts may give it that strict,
and, in my judgment, narrow construction.
72
Howard proceeded to assert that Congress intended a broader purpose
than the strict language of the amendment relating to federal or state dis-
criminatory legislation. He said that it intended to assure Negroes the opportunity
to vote. But he hesitated to say what the United States Supreme Court would
construe the amendment to mean and expressed the fear that the state courts
69 42 (1) GLOBE app. 116 (1871). Bingham himself admitted engaging in unconstitutional
hanky-panky in 1866. See 41 (2) GLOBE 1747 (1870).
70 41 (2) GLOBE 3654-55 (1870).
71 See Avins, The Fifteenth Amendment and Literacy Tests: The Original Intent, 18
STAN. L. REv. 808, 813-14, 817-18, 820 (1966).
72 41 (2) GLOBE 3655 (1870).
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would give it a "narrow construction" which would exclude the punishment
of individuals for preventing Negroes from voting, "which was the great objec-
tive we had in view in proposing this amendment.... "" Howard protested
against such a construction as being out of harmony with the advocates of the
amendment and because it would largely deprive Negroes of remedies "which
[were] in the minds of its authors when it was under discussion in these
Chambers."7
What was in the minds of the framers of the fifteenth amendment nobody
knows, but what was in their speeches is a matter of record. The dominant
Republicans, especially in the Senate, presented the apex of discord to the
country, and the compromise conference report that was finally hammered out
was the subject of keen disappointment.75 But in the proposals, counterproposals
objections, cross-objections, disputes, and solutions, which filled a large portion
of the Congressional Globe for the third session of the Fortieth Congress, scarcely
a word can be found indicating that anyone was interested in private individuals
preventing Negroes from voting. There were too many other priority objections
to the various drafts of the amendment. There were long discussions about
uprooting state laws and constitutions wholesale,76 but none about private con-
duct. If Congress intended to solve the latter problem it was the best kept secret
in the country, and its final product was a peculiarly poor job of legislative
drafting.
The only possible conclusion is that everybody overlooked the problem of
private violence. This is hardly surprising. Considering the confusion and haste
that surrounded the amendment's proposal, it is very believable that Congresg
in the rush overlooked the matter entirely. This frequently occurs when legisla-
tion is enacted under time pressure. It is possible that had the question of private
violence to prevent Negro voting been brought up in 1869 when the fifteenth
amendment was upon its passage, the draft would have been broadened to give
the Congress the power to forbid such violence. However, it is also possible
that Howard would have found himself in the minority on this issue as he did
in respect to other matters. Such a possibility is fortified by the rejection of the
first Bingham draft of the first section of the fourteenth amendment. But what-
ever may have been in the minds of Howard and others in Congress regarding
private violence to bar voting, none of it got into their speeches or into the
fifteenth amendment itself. Thus, if the spirit exhibited in Howard's ex post facto
self-serving declaration pervaded the Enforcement Act of 1870, the statute may
be safely disregarded as a contemporaneous construction of either the fourteenth
or the fifteenth amendment.
The remarks of Senator Pool, upon which the Justice Department's brief
so heavily relied, are also instructive. Pool, not a member of Congress in 1866
when the fourteenth amendment was proposed, was one of the two Republicans
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Avins, supra note 71, passim.
76 See, e.g., 40 (3) GLoBE 1036-37 (1869) (remarks of Senator Trumbull); id. at 1039-40
(remarks of Senator Sherman); id. at 1427 (remarks of Representative Bingham).
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to vote against the fifteenth amendment." He observed that
these Kuklux . . . mean to render invalid and inefficient in its operation
the provisions of the fifteenth amendment; but it is done in an indirect
way. . . I have not the fifteenth amendment before me, but I think it
provides that no State shall debar a man from the right to vote because
of his race, color, or previous condition. Standing at the ballot-box and
keeping colored men away by force would hardly be a violation of the
laws of the Union. They have not done that; that is not the purpose; the
purpose is terrorism and intimidation and thus to prevent the exercise
of the right to vote. 8
In spite of this dear recognition that the fifteenth amendment limited only state
action, about one month later Senator Pool proposed provisions purporting to
enforce that amendment by punishment of private individuals who interfered
with the right to vote, along with a broader provision which became the sixth
section of the Enforcement Act and which punished private conspiracies to
intimidate citizens in the exercise of their constitutional rights.79 On the surface,
at least, it appears that Congress was more concerned with securing the Negro
vote for the Republican Party in the South8" than in the constitutional limitations
of the amendments it was purporting to enforce. In an age of notoriously low
political morality, one can well credit Representative Farnsworth's confession.
There is thus good reason to discredit completely the Justice Department's theory
of contemporaneous construction.
However, it would still be instructive to examine the debates on the En-,
forcement Act of 1870, taking them at face value, to see to what extent they
actually did reflect the theory of the framers of the fourteenth amendment. On
April 15, 1870, while the readmission of Georgia was under consideration,
Senator Pool made a long speech about the activities of the Ku Klux Klan,
which was very active in his home state of North Carolina. Pool commenced
by admitting that crime was committed all over the country, and asserted that
his state was freer of ordinary crimes of violence than most other areas. He added
that as a practicing lawyer, he was able to state that ordinary crimes were ef-
ficiently punished. But Pool observed that political murders committed by the
Ku Klux Klan were not punished because state officials were unable or unwilling
to ferret out and punish the offenders. He declared that "[i]f by acts of com-
mission or omission a State will not protect its citizens, then the United States
is bound to protect life and property when a case is made for its interference."'"
Pool then observed that the purpose of the crimes committed by the Klan was
to deter Negroes from voting or to force them to vote the Democratic ticket.
He added that the local law enforcement officers do nothing to stop these
political crimes, and indeed, asserted that the local sheriffs and their deputies
were "winking at their proceedings."' s Pool also charged that the grand juries
77 Id. at 1641.
78 41 '(2) GLOBE 2722 (1870).
79 Id. at 3612.
80 Negro votes provided the margia of victory for President Grant's re-election in 1872;
see 43 CONG. REc. 1314 (1874) (remarks of Representative Ransier).
81 41 (2) GLOBE 2718 (1870).
82 Id. at 2719.
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and petit juries were stacked with Klansmen, so that there was no protection
from the law.8" Furthermore, he declared that the large majority of the southern
whites were opposed to the congressional reconstruction policy and to the fifteenth
amendment and were determined to thwart it by violence." He then concluded
that southern colored Republicans received no protection in life or property from
law enforcement agencies of the state. 5 On May 19, 1870, Pool returned to theo
same point right before introducing his proposal in a speech quoted in the Justice
Department's brief"6 and in the appendix to the Price opinion." After adverting,
to his prior speech, Pool asserted that a state might not only "deny" to Negroes
the right to vote by enacting positive legislation prohibiting it,
but by acts of omission it may practically deny the right. The legisla-
tion of Congress must be to supply acts of omission on the part of the
States. If a State shall not enforce its laws by which private in-
dividuals shall be prevented by force from contravening the rights of
the citizen under the amendment, it is in my judgment the duty of the
United States Government to supply that omission, and by its own laws
and by its own courts to go into the States for the purpose of giving the
amendment vitality there.8
Observing that the word "deny" appears not only in the fifteenth amendment
but in the equal protection dause of the fourteenth amendment as well, Pool
noted:
It shall not deny by acts of omission, by a failure to prevent its own citizens
from depriving by force any of their fellow-citizens of these rights. It is
only when a State omits to carry into effect the provisions of the civil rights
act, and to secure the citizens in their rights, that the provisions of the
fifth section of the fourteenth amendment would be called into operation,
which is, "that Congress shall enforce by appropriate legislation the pro-
visions of this article."8 19
Pool then asserted that federal legislation could not prevent states from passing
unconstitutional laws, and therefore it would have to penalize the individual
citizen. He reasoned that if a state official is penalized under the federal law
for violation of the constitutional rights of a person, "it operates upon him as
a citizen, and not as an officer." 9 Pool therefore concluded that Congress could
just as well penalize a private citizen as a state officer in his private capacity."
Of course, this reasoning is exactly contrary to the original reasoning of the Civil
Rights Bill and the fourteenth amendment. As previously noted, Bingham was
interested in punishing state officers for violation of their oaths to support the
Constitution. Necessarily, private citizens could not be punished since they
took no such oath. Hence, a state officer who was indicted for violating a
83 Id.
84 Id. at 2718-19.
85 Id. at 2722.
86 Brief for appellant at 14-15, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
87 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807-20 (1966).
88 41 '(2) GLOBE 3611 (1870); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 810 (1966).
89 41 (2) GLOBE 3611 (1870); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 811 (1966).
90 41 (2) GLOBE 3611 (1870); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 812 (1966).
91 Id.
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citizen's constitutional rights could only be indicted as an officer and not, as Pool
thought, as a private person. Since Pool was not a member of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, his error is understandable.
Pool continued by discussing the need to penalize conspiracies to violate
fourteenth and fifteenth amendment rights.92 He also advocated the trial of
defendants in federal courts on the ground that state court juries were either
friends of the defendants or intimidated by them. Returning to the constitutional
point, he reiterated that since Congress could not legislate against the states, it
would have to direct its legislation against individuals. Pool concluded:
Mr. President, the liberty of a citizen of the United States, the pre-
rogatives, the rights, and the immunities of American citizenship, should
not be and cannot be safely left to the mere caprice of States either in the
passage of laws or in the withholding of that protection which any emergency
may require. If a State by omission neglects to give to every citizen within
its borders . . . enjoyment of his rights it is the duty of the United States
Government to go into the State, and by its strong arm to see that he does
have the full and free enjoyment of those rights.
93
Reading Pool's two speeches together, his meaning seems reasonably clear.
He said that there were, in the South, state-wide conspiracies to deprive Re-
publicans, especially if they were colored, of their right to vote, and that local
law enforcement officers were collaborating with these conspiracies by not giving
colored or other Republicans protection. Accordingly, the state officials were
denying equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth amendment,
a position which hardly seems disputable. Pool also observed that the word
"deny" appeared in the fifteenth amendment and might also cover state inaction
in not affording requisite protection of facilities. This position is also quite
plausible. Pool then asserted that the cure for such violations of the constitutional
amendments by state officials was to substitute federal enforcement machinery
that would bear directly on the private criminals rather than on the negligent
state officials, a position not sustainable by the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment, although plausible to a lawyer of the time, as will be noted more
fully below. The position that a finding of a state denial of equal protection
as a result of a state-wide conspiracy of law enforcement officials could be
remedied by substituting federal prosecution for the inactive state machinery
is a far cry from the Guest case opinions that the federal government can directly
prosecute private conspiracies to violate federal rights by violence without an
antecedent finding of state violation by wilful neglect to enforce equal protection.
The fact that the drafts of Pool's legislation did not mention this assumed
antecedent is hardly surprising since it was common knowledge universally
assumed.9"
It might be noted in passing that the Justice Department's brief in Guest
92 41 (2) GLOBE 3611-12 "(1870); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 812-13, (1966).
93 41 (2) GLOBE 3613 (1870); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 819 (1966).
94 See 42 (1) GLOBE app. 116 (1871), where Representative Samuel Shellabarger, an
Ohio Republican lawyer in charge of the anti-Ku Klux Klan bill, answered Representative
Farnsworth's assertion that the punishment of conspiracies was not linked to unconstitutional
state acts by saying: "it assumes that the State has denied protection to some of its citizens."
[February, 1968]
[Vol. 43:317] FEDERAL POWER TO PUNISH INDIVIDUAL CRIMES 333
only mentioned the second of Pool's two speeches and ignored the first one with
which it was linked. 5 This may have caused confusion in the minds of somo
of the Supreme Court justices as to its true import."
The assertion that the fourteenth amendment is intended to govern state
action only, and not the acts of private individuals, is reinforced by an examination
of the other relevant debate on the Enforcement Act of 1870. Senator George
F. Edmunds, a Vermont Republican lawyer, pointed out that the real problem in
the South was that local law enforcement agencies, namely sheriffs, judges, and
jurors, did not want to enforce the law and extend equal protection in political
cases.97 Senator Timothy Howe, a Wisconsin Republican, noted that in Missis-
sippi a white lawyer who killed a federal tax collector in cold blood for political
reasons went unpunished because of community sentiment.9 s Senator William
Stewart, a Nevada Republican lawyer who was in charge of the enforcement
bill for the Judiciary Committee, approved of Pool's proposals to deal with Klan-
inspired mob violence.9"
Senator Oliver P. Morton, an Indiana Republican lawyer, observed that
the fifteenth amendment left "completely under the control of the several States
[the right] to punish violations of the right of suffrage,"' 0' except as the fifteenth
amendment took away state power to deny the right to vote on the grounds
specified, and Edmunds agreed with him."0' Senator William T. Hamilton, a
Maryland Democratic lawyer, in speaking against the bill, noted that the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments were phrased like article I, section 10 of
the original Constitution, as prohibitions against the states, and not like the
thirteenth amendment or the fugitive slave clause of article IV, section 2, which
do not in terms address themselves to state action.0 2 He added that private
violation of the right to vote was not punishable by federal power under the
fifteenth amendment.' 3
Senator Howard spoke in favor of enforcing the right to vote by federal
instrumentalities since he considered it likely that southern governors would not
interfere if Democratic mobs drove Negroes away from the polls.' Senator
George H. Williams, an Oregon Republican, a former state judge, and later
Attorney General in President Grant's cabinet, objected to the bill "because it
is indefinite and vague in all or nearly all of its provisions."'0 5 Williams, who
had been a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress which had reported out the fourteenth amendment, and who
had participated actively in the debates on the fifteenth amendment, declared:
"Senators upon this floor, grave and learned Senators, whose Republicanism
95 Brief for appellant at 14-15, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
96 See 34 U.S.L.W. 3165-66 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1965).
97 41 (2) GLoBE 1956 (1870). See also his remarks, id. at 3563.
98 Id. at 2611-12.
99 Id. at 3559.
100 Id. at 3571.
101 Id.
102 Id. at app. 354-55.
103 Id. at app. 360.
104 Id. at 3655.
105 Id. at 3656.
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is beyond question, have expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of many of
its provisions."'0 6
Senator Eugene Casserly, a California Democratic lawyer and former cor-
poration counsel of New York City, returned to Hamilton's point by noting that
the fifteenth amendment was a limitation only on federal or state power and
operated in the same way as the negative limitations of article I, section 10 of
the original Constitution. He also felt that the power to enforce the amendment
added nothing to the substantive provisions. He therefore concluded that Con-
gress could not penalize the actions of individuals.' 7 Casserly conceded that
Congress could penalize the actions of state officers acting under state laws, but
not private individuals acting on their own volition. Senator Matthew Car-
penter, a Wisconsin Republican lawyer and a member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, interrupted him to suggest that Congress might find power to protect
voters under the first section of the fourteenth amendment. Casserly replied that
the fourteenth amendment also dealt with state action alone and not individual
action, so that Congress derived no more assistance from this than from the
fifteenth amendment.' He concluded that Congress had no power to deal with
private violence since such criminal acts were not the acts of the state.0 9
Senator Stewart replied that the bill was necessary for the fall elections
because the southern Democrats would drive Negroes en masse from the polls."'
Senator Allen G. Thurman, a Democrat and a former chief justice of the Ohio
Supreme Court, rose to concur with Casserly. He emphasized that the fifteenth
amendment dealt only with the actions of states, or with state officials enforcing
state laws, and not with the criminal acts of individuals."' Thurman, too, drew
an analogy between the prohibitions laid on the states in article I, section 10
and the fifteenth amendment and pointed out that neither was designed to affect
private action. Senator Pool then interrupted him to ask what he would answer
if a state passed a law that no election official should be punished for refusing
106 Id. at 3657.
107 Id. at app. 472-73.
108 Id. at app. 473.
109 Id. at app. 474.
110 Id. at 3658-59.
111 Id. at 3661. Thurman observed:
This, then, being simply a limitation on the power of the State, simply withholding
from it one of the powers which it heretofore possessed, the power of fixing the
qualifications of electors, or restricting that power in a single particular, it is as
plain, it seems to me, as the sun at noon-day in a cloudless sky, that this amendment
can only be held to speak of a State as a State . . . in her political character, . . .
and does not deal with individuals at all.
'The prohibition here is upon the State. Can you undertake to punish an
individual who is not acting under the authority of the State, but directly against
the statute law of the State, and who is punishable under that statute law by
indictment in the courts of the State? And yet you undertake to say that that
individual, thus acting contrary to the law of his State, liable to punishment by his
own State in her own courts, can be taken away from the jurisdiction of his State
. . . into a Federal court to be punished under an act of Congress.
It is amazing to me that any lawyer can think for a moment that this bill in
this respect where it acts on individuals-not officers of a State at all, mere private
individuals, mere trespassers, mere breakers of the peace, mere violators of the
State law-that this bill which seizes them and punishes them under this act of
Congress and in the Federal Courts is warranted by the fifteenth amendment of the
Constitution.
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to register or receive the vote of a Negro. Thurman replied that such a law
would violate the Constitution, but that it could not be supposed that a state
would enact such an unconstitutional law. To this Pool answered that the
fifteenth amendment contemplated that a state might by positive legislation or
by omission deny the right to vote to Negroes. He added that if a state failed
to punish officers who would not receive ballots from Negroes, the efficacy of the
amendment would be broken down unless Congress punished them under its
power to pass appropriate legislation. Thurman retorted that such laws could
be invalidated by the federal judiciary, but that Congress had no power to punish
private individuals who did not hold state office.112
Senator John Sherman, the veteran Ohio Republican lawyer and legislator,
then propounded a new theory. He professed agreement with Thurman and
asserted that the bill was only intended to limit state action. The following
colloquy then occurred:
Mr. SHERMAN ... What I mean is that all the provisions of the
law are to prevent persons or officers, under the color of State authority,
from denying a man the right of suffrage. My colleague cannot deny that
we can by appropriate legislation prevent any private person from shielding
himself under a State regulation, and thus denying to a person the right
to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Our
right of appropriate legislation extends to every citizen of a State, the
humblest as well as the highest.
Mr. CASSERLY. I should like to ask the Senator from Ohio how a
State can be said to abridge the right of a colored man to vote when some
irresponsible person in the streets is the actor in that wrong?
Mr. SHERMAN. If the offender, who may be a loafer, the meanest
man in the streets, covers himself under the protection or color of a law
or regulation or constitution of a State, he may be punished for doing it.
Mr. CASSERLY. Suppose the State law authorizes the colored man to
vote; what then?
Mr. SHERMAN. That is not the case with which we are dealing....
This bill only proposes to deal with offenses committed by officers or persons
under color of existing State law, under color of existing State constitutions.
No man could be convicted under this bill reported by the Judiciary Com-
mittee unless the denial of the right to vote was done under color or pre-
tense of State regulation. The whole bill shows that.113
Here we have an interesting theory underlying the legal basis of the bill which
is certainly not apparent on its face. Yet the theory is by no means illogical.
The fifteenth amendment uprooted many state constitutions and laws forbidding
Negroes from voting. The Republicans complained during the debate that Demo-
crats were continuing to follow these state constitutions and laws in spite of the
fifteenth amendment.' Apparently, Sherman evisaged a Democratic mob which
turned Negroes away from the polls as a private enforcement of these state laws;
the mob was assuming the character of state agents in enforcing state laws.
Senator Garrett Davis, a Kentucky Democratic lawyer, seized on Sherman's
112 Id. at 3662-63.
113 Id. at 3663.
114 See id. at 3568 (remarks of Senator Sherman), 3658 (remarks of Senator Stewart),
3758 (remarks of Senator Williams).
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admission that state action would have to be involved and asserted that a state
could only act through its officials and not "by its isolated and straggling cit-
izens.""' He therefore concluded that Congress could not penalize private
citizens. 16 Davis further asserted that the amendment reached only state legisla-
tion,1 7 a point on which Senator Joseph S. Fowler, a conservative Tennessee
Republican concurred." 8
Senator Oliver P. Morton, an Indiana Republican, asserted that the debates
on the fifteenth amendment would show that Congress, in the second section, did
not intend to be confined to legislating against state officials or state laws. He
argued that these debates recorded in the Congressional Globe of the previous
year, indicated that Congress could penalize private persons who interfered with
Negro voting."9 Morton, who had participated in these debates, quoted no
specific passage therein, and the comments previously made in conjunction with
Howard's speech, namely that no such recorded debates dealing with private
interference existed, apply here also. The pressing necessity of preserving Negro
votes against Klan interference seems to have resulted in conjuring up some
non-existent debates.
When voting on the bill commenced, Morton offered an amendment to
punish private interference with Negro voting which was carried on a party-line
vote. A Democratic-sponsored amendment was then offered to limit this section
to acts "under or by color of State authority."" Thurman observed that it had
been asserted in debate that this section applied only to persons acting under state
authority. He supported the amendment to "show whether the Senate means
that that section shall apply only to persons acting under State authority or
color of State authority, or whether Congress assumes to punish every ruffian
as the embodiment of the State.""' No doubt Thurman was referring to the
theory of his colleague, Sherman. However, this amendment was voted down
by a strict party-line vote, with Sherman being absent."'
Thurman then attacked the whole proceeding. He observed that these
sections had been adopted in an all-night session, with Senators absent or sleep-
ing on sofas "and only aroused from their slumbers when there was a division
of the Senate or when their presence was necessary in order to make a quorum."" 3
He added that some of the bill was not grounded on the fifteenth amendment,
but on Congress' power under the original Constitution to control federal elec-
tions. Trumbull also suggested that the bill be printed and postponed. But
Stewart declared that the Senate was under time pressure. 4 The bill was then
passed by a party-line vote."'
In the House, only a brief objection was made that the bill went beyond
115 Id. at 3666.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 3667.
118 Id. at app. 421.
119 Id. at 3670-71.
120 Id. at 3684.
121 Id.
122 Id. It is relevant to note that Pool's section had been adopted without a roll-call only
a short time before. Id. at 3679.
123 Id. at 3688.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 3690.
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Congress' power by punishing private individuals 2 6 In his speech supporting
the bill, Bingham did not address himself to this point at all. 27 However, -in
the next session, when the Supplementary Enforcement Act 28 was passed, some
House Democrats harped on the theme that the fifteenth amendment prohibited
only state interference with Negro voting and did not authorize enforcement
against private individuals. 2 ' Bingham merely replied that the fourteenth
amendment gave Congress power "to correct and restrain by law the abuses of
State authority."'3 0 He added that the Enforcement Act of 1870 was principally
designed to enforce the similarly worded fifteenth amendment without addressing
himself at all to the question of whether Congress could punish private in-
dividuals. 3'
Democratic Senators likewise reiterated the point that the fifteenth amend-
ment only prevents state discriminatory action and does not restrain private
individuals. They therefore concluded that the second section of the amendment,
which gives Congress the power to enforce it, being ancillary to the first section,
would not allow Congress to pass a law penalizing purely private action. 2
Thus, Senator Francis P. Blair of Missouri observed that the fifteenth amendment
was worded in the same way as the negative prohibitions of article I, section 10
of the original Constitution, and no one had suggested that these were enforceable
against individuals."-
The debates on the Enforcement Act of 1870, upon which both the Justice
Department and the majority of the Supreme Court so heavily relied, show,
first of all, a considerable willingness to stretch the terms of the fifteenth amend-
ment to cover the problem of private violence, which was overlooked when
the amendment was upon its passage. To this extent, the act cannot be deemed
a contemporaneous construction of that amendment or the fourteenth amend-
ment, and rather represents action by Congress outside of its constitutional powem
to meet what was felt to be a pressing political necessity. Also, such action was
predicated upon what was deemed to be an intentional denial of equal protection
to southern Republican voters, especially Negroes, by local state authorities, even
though this basis for congressional action was not stated in terms in the bill.
To that extent, Congress was indeed curing unconstitutional state inaction. The
question presented to Congress was the punishment of private conspiracies to
violate federal rights only when sheltered by intentional state refusal* to afford
protection to the victims. This latter constitutional underpinning was wholly
overlooked in the Guest case opinions.
With the presence of unconstitutional state refusal to act as the basis for
federal intervention, the question was narrowed to what remedy was permis-
sible and appropriate to enforce the amendments. Instead of directing its pen-
alties to inactive state officers, Congress chose to substitute federal officers and
126 Id. at app. 416 (remarks of Representative Smith).
127 Id. at 3883.
128 Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433.
129 41 (3) GLOBE 1272 (1871) (remarks of Representative Eldridge); id. at app. 123-24
(remarks of Representative Woodward).
130 Id. at 1283.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1635 (remarks of Senator Vickers), id. at app. 162 (remarks of Senator Bayard).
133 Id. at app. 158.
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machinery to afford direct protection to victims. How this remedy came to be
used will now occupy our attention.
V. The Influence of Prigg v. Pennsylvania
The use by Congress of a remedy for unconstitutional state inaction by
substituting federal machinery, although not warranted by the terms of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, can only be understood in light of the
profound influence the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania34 had on lawyers of the
period. The Justice Department's brief in the Guest case cited this case, in
passing, for the proposition that Congress may enforce rights secured in the
Constitution even without a specific grant of power. 5 The Justice Department
did this without noticing the crucial significance of Bingham's disagreement with
this point which led him to vote against the civil rights bill in 1866.'
The Supreme Court's opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania was delivered by
Mr. Justice Story at the apex of his reputation. He held that the fugitive slave
clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution could be enforced by federal
legislation and in dictum declared that states could not be required to enforce it.
If, indeed, the constitution guarantees the right, and if it requires the de-
livery upon the claim of the owner (as cannot well be doubted), the natural
inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the
appropriate authority and functions to enforce it. The fundamental principle,
applicable to all cases of this sort, would seem to be, that where the end is
required, the means are given; and where the duty is enjoined, the ability
to perform it is contemplated to exist, on the part of the functionaries to
whom it is entrusted. The clause is found in the national constitution,
and not in that of any state. It does not point out any state functionaries,
or any state action, to carry its provisions into effect. The states cannot,
therefore, be compelled to enforce them; and it might well be deemed an
unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist, that the
states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the
national government, nowhere delegated or entrusted to them by the con-
stitution. On the contrary, the natural, if not the necessary, conclusion is,
that the national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to
the contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments, legislative,
judicial or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the
rights and duties imposed upon it by the constitution.
37
The impact of this opinion on the then existing legal view of federal-state rela-
tions stemmed from two primary sources. First, it constituted the constitutional
basis for the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850,"s which as part of the Compromise
of 1850 had vast political consequences and served as a political irritant that
led to war. Second, it was in the same section of the original Constitution as
the privileges and immunities clause, which for twenty years the North had been
134 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
135 Brief for appellant at 23, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
136 39 (1) GLOBE 1291 (1866).
137 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-16 '(1842). The dictum that states
lacked concurrent power to enforce the fugitive slave provision was denied in Weaver v. Fegely
& Brother, 29 Pa. 27, 30 (1857).
138 Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
506 (1859).
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attempting to enforce in favor of freed Negroes.3 9 Like this clause, it was a
general declaration of constitutional right not in terms phrased as a limitation
on state action.
When the slaves were freed by the thirteenth amendment, it was not sur-
prising that the machinery used in the Civil Rights Act of 1866140 to enforce the
privileges and immunities clause in their favor should be borrowed from the
familiar machinery of the Fugitive Slave Law which enforced a similarly worded
constitutional provision found in the same section. As Senator Trumbull, who
drafted the bill and who was in charge of it as Judiciary Committee Chairman,
observed: "Most of [the provisions of the bill] are copied from the late fugitive
slave act, adopted in 1850 for the purpose of returning fugitives from slavery
into slavery again." 41  Notwithstanding Trumbull's long-winded perorations
on the need to make freedmen really free by enforcement of the thirteenth
amendment, as Senator Lot M. Morrill, a Maine Republican lawyer later ob-
served, the civil rights bill was deemed to be supported under the old privileges
and immunities clause and not the thirteenth amendment at all. ' 2 Trumbull
himself recognized this by citing cases interpreting that clause in his opening
speech, 4" as he later virtually admitted.'"
Examination of the House debates is even more illuminating. Representative
James F. Wilson, the Iowa Republican lawyer in charge of the bill for the House
Judiciary Committee, stated that the bill was merely enforcing the privileges
and immunities clause. 4 Wilson, like Trumbull, linked the substantive pro-
139 See, e.g., 30 (2) GLOBE 418 (1849) (remarks of Representative Hudson); 31 (1) GLOBE
app. 124 (1850) (remarks of Senator Davis, Mass.); id. at app. 1655 (remarks of Senator
Winthrop); 33 (1) GLOBE app. 1012 (1854) (remarks of Senator Sumner); 35 (1) GLOBE
1964 (1858) (remarks of Senator Fessenden); id. at 1966-67 (remarks of Senators Fessenden
and Wilson); 35 (2) GLOBE 952 (1859) (remarks of Representative Granger); id. at 980
(remarks of Representative Cochrane); id. at 984 (remarks of Representative Bingham).
140 Oh. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
141 39 (1) GLOBE 475 (1866). See also Trumbul's defense of using the Fugitive Slave Law
for enforcement machinery, id. at 605. He declared that "we propose to use the provisions of
the fugitive slave law for the purpose of punishing those who deny freedom . .Y Id.
142 42 (2) GLOBE 730 (1872) Morrill said:
. . . the honorable Senator from Massachusetts is utterly mistaken if he supposes
that the civil rights bill was drawn from the thirteenth amendment at all. . .. I
did not question the constitutionality of the civil rights bill; but it would have been
constitutional before the thirteenth amendment; it was not drawn under that amend-
ment, nor does it look to that at all as its source of authority. It looks to that other
provision of the Constitution in the fourth article, which provides for the equal priv-
ileges and immunities of the citizens in the several States. That is where its authority
is found.
143 39 (1) GLOBE 474-75 (1866).
144 Id. at 600, where Trumbull said:
[t]he cases were . .. introduced .. . for the purpose of ascertaining, if we could, by
judicial decision what was meant by the term "citizen of the United States;" and
inasmuch as there had been judicial decisions upon this clause of the Constitution, in
which it had been held that the rights of a citizen of the United States were certain
great fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to liberty, and to avail one's self of
all the laws passed for the benefit of the citizen to enable him to enforce his rights;
inasmuch as this was the definition given to the term as applied in -that part of the
Constitution, I reasoned from that, that when the Constitution had been amended
and slavery abolished, and we were about to pass a law declaring every person, no
matter of what color, born in the United States a citizen of the United States, the
same rights would then appertain to all persons who were clothed with American
citizenship.
145 Id. at 1117-18. He declared:
Mr. Speaker, I think I may safely affirm that this bill, so far as it declares the
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visions of the privileges and immunities clause with the enforcement provisions
of the second section of the thirteenth amendment because of serious consti-
tutional doubts that Congress had the power to enforce the original constitu-
tional provision unaided. He, too, observed that most of the enforcement
machinery was "based on the act of September 18, 1850, commonly known as
the 'fugitive slave law,' the constitutionality of which has been affirmed over
and over again by the courts."' 46 Furthermore, to quiet the very serious con-
stitutional doubts of a number of fellow Republicans,' Wilson read the pas-
sage previously quoted from Prigg which interpreted the companion fugitive
slave clause as showing the power of Congress to enforce the rights of citizens
in the privileges and immunities clause and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. He then declared that this case showed that Congress already had
the power to do what Bingham's previously introduced constitutional amend-
ment would have given them the power to do, namely, to enforce the rights of
citizens. 4 '
Bingham, on the other hand, although agreeing wholeheartedly with the
objects of the civil rights bill, was of the opinion that Prigg was inapplicable
and that enforcement of the rights of citizens was left to the good faith of the
states. Such a position was certainly an arguable one, since Mr. Justice Story
had indicated that the federal government could not only set up machinery to
return fugitive slaves, but that states could not be required to do so. Bingham
noted, however, that
the Constitution does not delegate to the United States the power to punish
offenses against the life, liberty, or property of the citizen in the States,
nor does it prohibit that power to the States, but leaves it as the reserved
power of the States, to be by them exercised.1 49
To remedy this want of power to enforce the existing Constitution, Bingham
introduced his first draft amendment. 5 ' The effect of this draft would have been
to embody the rule of Prigg into a constitutional amendment. But as previously
noted, many Republicans were opposed to giving Congress power to pass a
uniform law to protect life, liberty, and property, similar to the uniform law for
the return of the fugitive slaves. 5' Hence, as Bingham himself later declared,
when he came to redraft the first section of the fourteenth amendment, he
equality of all citizens in the enjoyment of civil rights and immunities, merely affirms
existing law. We are following the Constitution. We are reducing to statute form
the spirit of the Constitution. We are establishing no new right, declaring no new
principle. It is not the object of this bill to establish new rights, but to protect and
enforce those which already belong to every citizen. . . . If the States would all
practice the constitutional declaration, that "The citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," (Article four,
section two, Constitution of the United States,) and enforce it, . . . we might very
well refrain from the enactment of this bill into a law.
146 Id. at 1118.
147 Id. at 1266-67 (remarks of Representative Raymond); id. at 1291-93 (remarks of Rep-
resentative Bingham) ; id. at 1293 (remarks of Representative Shellabarger) ; id. at app. 156-59
(remarks of Representative Delano).
148. Id. at 1294.
149 Id. at 1291.
150 Id. at 1033-34.
151 See, e.g., id. at 1095 (remarks of Representative Hotchkiss).
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imitated the framers of the original Constitution in article I, section 10, by im-
posing negative limitations on the powers of the states. 52 As Bingham wrote
in 1871:
The fourteenth amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges
or immunities before mentioned [in the original Constitution], but was
deemed necessary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon the
powers of the States. It had been judicially determined that the first eight
articles of amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the power
of the States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of the
provision of the second section, fourth article.15 3
Of course, the first section of the fourteenth amendment, after the declara-
tion as to citizenship, is so obviously similar to article I, section 10 that Demo-
cratic lawyers, in casting about for grounds to oppose Republican bills, guessed
that the former was patterned after the latter. But there was no public evidence
of this until Bingham's 1871 statement, and the inferential evidence from the
two drafts was not noted in any of the speeches, even by Democrats, and apparently
was forgotten. Considering the times, this is not as improbable as it might at
first seem. In the four years between 1866 and 1870 the country had gone
through a legal and political revolution. The exciting events of the times, such
as the reconstruction acts pressed on the South, the impeachment of President
Andrew Johnson, and the extension of the franchise to Negroes, would have
necessarily drawn so much attention as to push more technical questions into the
background. The redrafting of the relatively noncontroversial first section of
the fourteenth amendment, which was deemed "surplusage"' 54 because it merely
re-enacted what was already in the Constitution, was by comparison a very
technical matter; if it was overlooked, or its significance was unnoticed, it cannot
be considered surprising.
Indeed, it is of significance that the first time this redrafting was brought
up in debate was in 1871. Representatives Farnsworth and Garfield, both Re-
publican lawyers who had participated in the debates preceding the proposal
of the fourteenth amendment and who had spoken in its favor as well as voted
for it,"'55 brought up the redrafting by reading extensively from the 1866 Globe
to refresh their recollection. 56 If the very participants had to read from the Globe
to aid their memory, it is hardly to be wondered that senators and later members
of Congress who were not participants might have forgotten this fact.
Accordingly, Republicans who had forgotten about the redraft or were
unfamiliar with it continued to act as if Prigg applied to the fourteenth amend-
ment, and by analogy to the fifteenth amendment, even though Bingham's re-
visions, by converting the fourteenth amendment into a negative limitation on
state action, had made it inapplicable. The constant citation of this case by both
152 42 (1) GLOBE app. 84 (1871).
153 REPORTS OF COmMITTEES, H.R. REp. No. 22, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1 (1871).
154 J. JAmEs, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT, 123-24, 134-35, 145
(1956).
155 39 (1) GLOBE 2462-63 (1866) (remarks of Representative Garfield); id. at 2539 (re-
marks of Representative Farnsworth).
156 42 (1) GLOBE app. 115-16, 150-52 (1871).
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Republicans and Democrats during the reconstruction period shows that many
members-of Congress were following this familiar, although wholly inapplicable,
constitutional landmark.""r Insofar, therefore, as the Republicans were acting
bona fide, their mistake was a completely reasonable one. No better illustration
of this point can be made than the fact that Senator Pool himself, in urging his
section which was to go into the Enforcement Act of 1870, referred at length
to the enforcement machinery of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, passed under
the authority of Prigg, as a guide to the interpretation of the fifth section of the
fourteenth amendment. 5 '
VI. Conclusion
The majority of the opinions in the Guest case rest on two errors, one piled
on top of the other. The first error was that of the Republican senators during
the reconstruction period in applying the theory of Prigg to interpret the fifth
section of the fourteenth amendment. The error of the United States Supreme
Court was in taking the product of that erroneous interpretation and applying
it without noticing its limitation, namely, that as an antecedent a state or its
officials would have to refuse equal protection. The result has been to revert back
to the first Bingham draft and to read the word "state" right out of the four-
teenth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment does not give Congress the power to punish
private individuals violating the rights of others whatever their motive. Nor does
157 See, e.g., 39 (1) GLOBE 1270 (1866) (remarks of Representative Kerr); id. at 1836
(remarks of Representative Lawrence) ; 41 (2) GLOBE 3485 (1870) (remarks of Senator Thur-
man); id. at 3804 (remarks of Senator Bayard); 41 (3) GLOBE app. 166 (1871) (remarks of
Senator Bayard); 42 (1) GLOBE app. 231 (1871) (remarks of Senator Blair); id. at app. 219
(remarks of Senator Thurman); id. at app. 229 (remarks of Senator Boreman) ; id. at 795 (re-
marks of Representative Blair); 43 (1) RECORD 414 (1874) (remarks of Representative Law-
rence).
It is interesting to note that when Representative Benjamin F. Butler, a Massachusetts
Republican lawyer, reported a bill for the Committee on Reconstruction to protect southern
Republicans, as an enforcement of the fourteenth amendment, he modeled the legal machinery
"almost exactly upon the fugitive-slave law of 1850." See REPORTS OF COMMITTEES H.R. REP.
No. 37, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 4 (1871). Representative Samuel Shellabarger, an Ohio Repub-
lican lawyer who had participated in the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the four-
teenth amendment, declared that the latter amendment, in its first section, was similar to the
Fugitive Slave Clause of article IV, section 2, and that under the authority of Prigg, Congress
could enforce the fourteenth amendment with its own machinery. He did not mention the
Bingham redraft in 1866. 42(1) GLOBE app. 70 (1871). For a further example of Shella-
barger's views, see Memorial for Chief Justice Waite, 126 U.S. 585, 600 (1888).
Similarly, Representative David P. Lowe, a Kansas Republican ex-judge, declared:
Again, the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution further provides
that - [Fugitive Slave Clause quoted]
The similarity in expression of this section to the one quoted in the fourteenth
amendment [first section] is so apparent that its construction must lead to a just
understanding of the latter. . . . Under the second section of the fourth article a
statute was enacted in 1793 providing for the capture and surrender of fugitive slaves,
and in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania . . . Mr. Justice Story uses the following
language in reference to the fugitive slave law of 1793, as affected by the Constitu-
tion.... [quotation omitted]
Here, therefore, the doctrine is squarely enunciated by one of the purest and
ablest of the eminent jurists that have adorned our Supreme bench that where a State
refuses to comply with the requisitions and demands of the supreme law the Federal
Government may give effect to its Constitution and laws through its own agency. This
doctrine is ample for the exigencies of the present bill. The decision of the Supreme
Court in this case has been followed in very numerous cases, and the doctrine must
be considered settled, if any thing can be settled by adjudication. Id. at 375.
158 41 (2) GLOBE 3611 (1870).
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it permit Congress to punish conspiracies to violate federal rights. Any such
action is beyond the constitutional power granted to Congress under the fifth
section. The remedy given to Congress by the framers to assure equal protec-
tion lies in its right to proceed against state law enforcement officers who refuse
to accord equal protection to all persons. It is the duty of the states, by their
officials, to afford all persons the same protection that the laws grant to any
person in the states. If a state official willfully neglects to afford such protection,
he violates the constitutional right of the person so affected. Congress may,
under the fifth section, enforce the first section by punishing such official for
this willful refusal. But it may not proceed directly to punish private individuals
who violate the rights of citizens. Insofar as the majority of the opinions in the
Guest case hold to the contrary, they are inconsistent with the original under-
standing of the framers and are erroneous.
